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ABSTRA CT

This article argues that retirement income provision in Canada is built on gendered
assumptions, which produce material disadvantage for women. These inequalities are
being exacerbated by current neoliberal trends towards the ‘marketization’ and
individualization of pension provision, supported by tax, securities and corporate
legal norm s. The argument is developed using recent legislative changes to the
operation of the Canada Pension Plan and recent developments in the regulation of
mutual funds in Ontario as case studies. The article concludes by sketching out some
possible points of departure for feminist interventions in pension privatization
debates.

I NTR O DUC TI ON : G EN DER

AN D

RETIREME NT I N C OME

IN

C ANADA

T

HIS ARTICLE uses recent reforms to retirement income policies in
Canada as a site for examining aspects of the material impact of
neoliberal restructuring on Canadian women, as well as the role of
law in furthering this agenda. The argument of the article is
developed by first

demonstrating that the Canadian pension

framework, outlined briefly below, has been and continues to be
fundamentally gendered, both in its impact on individual women and
in the categories of analysis that are used to undergird the system.
Second, it is argued that this ‘genderedness’ is being intensified in
the current era of economic restructuring, such that many women are
being adversely materially affected. This is occurring because of
political choices that are being made, not just in Canada, to
‘marketize’ pension policy, that is, to link it even more closely to
the operation of financial markets. Two specific examples, (1)
reforms to the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) and (2) legal treatment of
mutual funds, will be described. One conclusion to be drawn from
these examples is that the gendered repositioning occasioned by
neoliberalism varies across class and sexuality. Thus, the shift to
financial markets, accompanied as it has been by the ambiguous
results of gender-oriented activism in political debate about the
CPP described below, suggests that feminist scholars may need to

both reconsider their focus on the welfare state as the locus of
materialist emancipatory politics (Fraser, 1998) and pay close
attention to the legal regimes that facilitate this market-oriented
restructuring.
It should be pointed out, of course, that it is not only by means of pension
reform that the Canadian state is being restructured in accordance with
neoliberal principles, with gendered implications. The research presented in
this article is part of a larger collaborative project 1 which is investigating the
implementation of privatizing policies in a variety of social and legal arenas
in Canada, such as labour markets, family and welfare policies, tax policy,
immigration, criminal justice, health policy and reproductive choice and
technologies. The particular focus of the project is the role of law in
privatization, both in terms of the myriad ways in which law and legal
regulation are implicated in this economic and social restructuring, and
also assessing the possibilities for using law in progressive ways to
counter the gender disadvantage which it is argued is occurring.

RETIREME N T I N C O ME PR O VISI ON

IN

CA N ADA

In a number of countries, retirement income policies tend to involve a
mixture of ‘public’ and ‘private’ provision, and thus to reflect the
interdependence of state and market. In Canada, retirement policy is
usually characterized as having three ‘tiers’. The first tier is represented by a
universal state benefit, known as the Old Age Security Program. 2 Funded

from general revenue, this is meant as an anti-poverty measure and it is
both taxable and repayable, above a threshold amount , by the more welloff. The second, the CPP, has been since 1966 a publicly administered
‘paygo’ plan (where the contributions of today’s workers support today’s
pensioners) from which all workers, and in some cases their spouses and
survivors, will receive benefits. These benefits are financed by mandatory
contributions from employers and employees, based on a percentage of
income. In the ‘income replacement’ language of pension policy, CPP
benefits are pitched so as to replace about 25 percent of pre-retirement
income, up to the Canadian average income of C$35,800 (1997 figures).3
The third tier is composed of a mixture of employer-sponsored pension
plans (RPPs), and individual ‘registered retirement savings plans’(RRSPs).
With respect to the former, it should be pointed out that employers are not
required to provide pension plans for their employees. In the latter,
employees voluntarily deposit money in a variety of investment vehicles
provided by financial institutions, and most notably in Canada by the
mutual fund sector. Such investment is facilitated by the fact that
employees no longer make contributions to CPP beyond the average
wage (Deaton, 1989: 228–9). While Canada is one of the ‘developed’
countries that has relied most heavily on the labour and financial
markets to provide retirement income for its citizens (Esping-Anderson,
1990; Orloff, 1993), the state and its laws have been implicated in these
tiered retirement sectors at all levels. Thus, the state accomplishes the

direct provision of income through the OAS, the collection of CPP
contributions and, until recently, lending out the modest surplus in the
CPP fund to provincial (or local) governments at below-market interest
rates, the regulation of employer-sponsored plans and the provision of
generous tax deductions to individuals sheltering income in RRSPs.

T H E G E N D ERE D L O G I C

OF

PE N SI ON S

Retirement pensions may be understood as a form of social insurance against
risk, in this case the risk of outliving one’s material resources when other
ways of accessing income are less tenable (Rose, 1996; Sohrab, 1996).
Understood as social insurance, they were one of the lynchpins of the postSecond World War welfare state, which attempted in a variety of ways to
secure the ‘pension promise’. Yet in most welfare states the capacity to access
this insurance against poverty at an advanced age derives not primarily
from being a citizen of a particular polity but either from a prior
connection to the paid labour market or from being in a familial
relationship with, or a survivor of, a wage earner (Donnelly, 1993; Orloff,
1993). Both the second and third tiers of Canada’s retirement policy, as
well as the GIS and Spouse’s Allowance components of OAS, are linked
in various ways to wage earning or family relationships. This point implies
that conceptually, as well as in practice, the distribution of the risk of being
materially disadvantaged in old age will vary across gender and sexuality,
since women’s differential relationship to the paid labour market reflects

their particular role in social reproduction (MacDonald, 1998).
With respect to the Canadian labour market, Townson has documented
extensively the phenomenon whereby women are much more likely than
men to be employed in ‘nonstandard’ work, which she defines as part-time
work, self-employment, temporary work, or multiple jobs with a series of
employers (Townson, 1997: 2–3). In 1994, for example, 40 percent of women,
as compared with 27 percent of men, worked in nonstandard jobs (1997: 13).
Specifically, 24 percent of all women workers compared with only 8 percent
of men were in part-time jobs, most often in the retail trade and other
consumer services (1997: 5, 8). This point is one not only about labour
market participation rates but also about pay. Thus, ‘the average earnings
of all women, including those who worked part-time or in other types of
work which was not full-time, full-year, were $20,219 in 1995 which was
still only 65% of the average earnings of all men at $31,053’ (1997: 16). The
impact on the ability to make contributions to labour market-based pension
schemes, and to receive benefits on the basis of contributions, is obvious.
As Orloff expresses it (1993: 314), ‘Women’s inferior status in the work force
means that women are disproportionately disadvantaged when benefits
reflect work related inequality’. In terms of family status, on the other
hand, Statistics Canada reports that, in 1993, 56 percent of all senior
women living alone or with unrelated persons had ‘low incomes’.4 As
Leonard and Nichols put it (1994: 9–11), ‘for the majority of women, their
marital status will determine their material conditions in old age, since

poverty is far more pronounced among single elders than among married
couples’. McDonald’s 1997 study of

retired widows, who ‘constitute

approximately 47% of the senior population’, and 49% of whom ‘lived
below the low income cut-offs of Statistics Canada’, leads her to reinforce
the claim that ‘married women are one husband away from poverty’
(McDonald, 1997b: vi–vii).
Further, Townson claims (1995: 6) that there are significant differences
between men and women in attitudes to retirement. In a survey she
completed of the ‘retirement readiness’ of Canadian women at midlife (i.e.
ages 45–54), ‘women seemed much less certain than men about the age at
which they would retire’. She argues that ‘the fact that 41% of women aged
45–54 have no specific retirement date in mind may reflect their lack of
financial planning for retirement as well as uncertainty about their financial
future and what measures they will have to take to secure it’. And of course,
in a demographic sense the extent of the risk of inadequate pension income is
gendered, in that life expectancy rates ensure that women will be dependent
on pension income for a greater proportion of their lives.

N E O LIBERALI SM, RISK A N D LAW

In the current, now well-entrenched, era of economic restructuring known
as neoliberalism, the gendered exposure to risk that pension logic represents
has intensified. This restructuring, which has been well documented

in

many developed and developing countries and across a variety of social

policy fronts, is signified by the ascendancy of the market over and inside the
state, with policy outcomes being determined by the market rather than by
central planning (Brodie, 1997; Miller and Rose, 1990). Strategies of
commodification (exposing social provisioning to a market delivery
system), retrenchment (removing various welfare benefits provided by the
state) and deregulation (dismantling the particular legal apparatus by
which the state governed, or ‘intervened in’ the economy ) are all said to be
implicated in the

phenomenon (Brodie, 1997). These strategies are

accompanied by a shift to what Rose (1996: 342) calls ‘a politics of risk’,
whereby individuals are being required increasingly to take responsibility
for their own and their families’ financial and personal security into the
future, with markets for risk management products emerging in a variety of
areas. Despite neoliberal claims to gender neutrality in these restructuring
efforts (Cossman, forthcoming), a political economy that relies increasingly
on the market to produce social policy may well have a differential effect
across genders, given women’s often more fragile connection to labour and
other markets and greater dependence on the state to recognize the
financial implications of their decommodified labour. This requires close
attention to the gender politics of risk that neoliberalism entails, not only in
terms of obvious issues of material well-being in the form of social security
benefits payable and contributions exacted (Sohrab, 1996), but also in terms
of the actual operating practices of a market based delivery system.
Social theorists who posit the shift to the ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992; Ericson
and Haggerty, 1997) tend to see it as accompanied by techniques of

governance (Hunt, 1999: 9–10) emphasizing actuarialism,

targeting,

‘privatized prudentialism’ (O’Malley, 1992) and ‘governance of the self’.
Thus, traditional legal forms of governance are decentred in the analysis,
and fragmented into codes of practice, self-regulation, or regulation by
contractual term (Cotterrell, 1995: 280; Rittich, 1998; Rose, 1996: 350–1).
However, it remains import ant to track changes in legal forms of governance
in neoliberalism, and to clarify the extent to which they are implicated in
producing inequalities of risk distribution (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997:
120–3; Pearce and

Tombs, 1996: 449). If market norms are in the

ascendancy, the continued relevance of the insight of critical legal scholars,
among others, that law and legal norms construct and shape markets and
market institutions in distinct ways is obvious (Blackburn , 1999: 6–8;
Gordon , 1987; Pearce and Tombs, 1996: 432). In terms of pensions
specifically, Esping-Anderson (1990: 79) has pointed out that ‘pensions
account for more than 10% of GD P in many contemporary nations’.
Accordingly, debates have taken place in many countries, Canada among
them, about the need for market solutions to alleged problems caused for the
welfare state of unfavourable demographic projections, involving a
declining workforce and an aging population. Institutions such as the World
Bank have targeted pension systems in economies in transition as in need of a
privatizing overhaul (Blackburn , 1999: 14–15). The most radical and oft-cited
example of a shift to a financial market-based pension system has occurred in
Chile. Here a pay-as-you-go system was abandoned in favour of a scheme
requiring workers to pay 10 percent of their income a year into an individual

retirement account of their choice, which they control and invest as they wish
(Fazio and Riesco, 1997). Similar proposals in the United States, involving so
called USAs (universal savings account s) have been floated by the Clinton
administration. Such schemes have obvious material advantages to private
providers of investment advice and transactions (Blackburn , 1999: 7–8;
Deaton, 1989). It is in this international context that policy and legal changes
in two elements of Canada’s retirement income pyramid are discussed in the
remainder of this article. These are (1) recent debates about the viability of the
Canada Pension Plan and (2) the changing regulation of mutual funds.5 The
focus of the discussion will be on how these developments have produced the
material repositioning of Canadian women, as well as how legal forms of
governance are implicated in this repositioning. Even more significantly, the
contrast that will become visible between developments in relation to CPP as
opposed to mutual funds suggests clearly that discussion of the trend towards
privatization in pension provision needs to be more explicit about how the
implications vary according to class position.

T H E G E N D ER P O LITI CS

OF

C PP REF O RM

The legislative changes to the operation of CPP that took place in Canada in
the fall of 1997 (CPP Investment Board Act) were preceded by widespread
debate at various levels of government, as well as by public and ‘expert’

consultations. This round of debates is usually taken to have begun in early
1994, when the Chief Actuary’s periodic report on the finances of the CPP,
required by its governing legislation concluded that ‘the recession and higher
than anticipated disability claims would necessitate increasing contribution
rates higher than previously expected’ (Townson, 1996: 30). The federal and
provincial governments issued a discussion paper in the mid-1990s and held
public consultations across Canada, 6 in which a ‘crisis of unsustainability’ of
the CPP was asserted. As is demonstrated in more detail in the discussion to
follow, the result of these public and parliamentary debates was that while
government proposals to reduce the amount s of benefits payable from CPP
were largely successfully opposed, contribution rates were increased.
Meanwhile, the investment of CPP funds in the financial markets rather
than in government bond s, with the objective of increasing returns to the
fund, was the centrepiece of the legislative changes. In feminist activist
terms, this was

an ambiguous result, since the most immediately

regressive aspects of the proposals, in relation to benefit issues, were
successfully resisted by the leftwing politicians, seniors’ organizations and
women’s organizations who spoke against them in consultation sessions. Yet
the more long-term material and discursive effects of the legislative changes,
which included destabilizing

the redistributive aspects of the Plan,

valorizing market-based solutions to pension provision and introducing
norms of private law to support this, were far less contested. Four key
themes will be isolated from these public and parliamentary reform

debates, as they illuminate both how neoliberal practice becomes persuasive
and how gendered material disadvantage was thereby intensified.

DEMOGRA PHICS

As in other countries, the reforms to CPP that were proposed and discussed
were premised on a governmental claim, supported by many pension experts
(Pesando, 1997; Robson, 1996; House of Commons, 1997e), of the
unsustainability of CPP in its then existing form. This claim was based
primarily on demographic projections of a declining workforce whose
contributions could not meet escalating claims by increasing numbers of
pensioners at the existing contribution levels. An aspect of this argument
was the claim that the problem with CPP was that ‘early generations did
not pay enough’ into the Plan relative to the amount s of benefits they
were currently receiving (Battle, 1996: 6–7). As the Federal/Provincial
Consultations Repor t put it, ‘The basic challenge facing Canadians is one
of fairness and equity. For the past 30 years, Canadians have paid much
less than the benefits they are receiving, or will receive, are worth . Future
generations will be asked to pay considerably more for the very same
benefits’ (Federal/Provincial/Territorial

CPP Consultations Secretariat,

1996a: 9). This opposition between the interests of young workers and
seniors was used by some expert commentators to mount a more general
onslaught on the redistributive aspects of public pension provision. Thus,

for example, Robson (1996: 25) argued that ‘These transfers from young to
old cannot be excused by casting the CPP as though its primary purpose
were redistribution rather than income replacement. . . The CPP provides
benefits similar to those available from private pension

plans and

insurance policies but does so in a way that is tilted dramatically against
today’s children’.
The solutions proposed by the government in its initial information paper
included a combination of ‘early increases in contribution rates and reduced
benefits or reduced access to benefits’ (Robson, 1996: 10). The demographic
premise on which these proposals were made was contested by left-leaning
politicians and social policy analysts mainly by pointing to the relative
contribution rates of Canadian workers vis-a-vis workers in European
countries, where more robust public pension systems, requiring higher
contribution

rates, were assumed to exist. Yet it is clear that the

demographic analysis on which the panic about unsustainability was based
was intrinsically gendered in two ways. First, it took no account of the issue
of women’s unpaid work, so that the only work that counted for these
demographic calculations was ‘paid’ work (Waring, 1988/90). Nor did it
acknowledge the changing nature of paid work more generally (McDonald,
1997a; McDaniel, 1997). The terms of the debate obscured a broader
analysis that would recognize not just that there may be fewer workers in
the paid labour market in the future, but that those workers’ earnings are not
growing and that workers, especially women, tend no longer to be in
continuous employment (McDaniel, 1997). This failure to problematize

the nature of the labour market beyond a focus on a declining number of
workers silenced or discounted a variety of alternative political solutions
posited by alternative definitions of the ‘problem’ of CPP. These would
include: raising above the average wage the ceiling whereby contributions
to CPP are still required to be made, thereby increasing the flow of
contributions from higher-income earners; intensifying political efforts at
job creation or other ways of increasing labour force participation,
especially women’s participation; removing or decreasing the tax deduction
that favours investing in private RRSPs, mostly by male workers (Young,
1997) or, even more radically, problematizing the assumed link between
labour markets and pension entitlements. Despite the interventions of
women’s organizations like the National Action Committee on the Status of
Women (NAC) (House of Commons, 1997f), the political solutions
ultimately forged were based on a refusal to recognize the gendered nature of
the labour market.

BENEFITS AND CON TRI BUTI ON S

The benefits received by women from CPP are typically lower than those
received by men, since their income-related contributions are lower.
However, CPP’s coverage of part-time workers and recognition of time out
of the paid labour force because of family responsibilities in the assessment
of benefits,7 as well as the availability of spousal pension sharing and survivor

benefits, may all be seen as better or worse attempts to recognize the
gendered material risk faced by women. The persistence of a traditional
discourse of family here, of course, has meant that women in lesbian
relationships are unable to qualify for the benefits of pension sharing or
survivorship. However, this issue is under active political reconsideration, in
part as a result of successful legal challenges on the basis of Charter-granted
equality rights8 (Rosenberg; Young, 1999; McCarthy, 1999).
Meanwhile, the 1997 legislative changes have resulted in: (1) an increase in
contribution rates from 5.85 percent of wages, up to the average wage in 1997,
to 9.9 percent by the year 2003, at which the rate will be then held steady; (2)
freezing the year’s basic exemption (the amount below which no
contributions are required) at $3,500 of income, instead of being indexed to
wages. In contrast, as mentioned earlier, the maximum amount at which
contributions are no longer required to be made was not raised from
$35,800; (3) the ultimate retirement benefit to be based on an average of the
last five years’ yearly maximum pensionable earnings (YMPE), instead of
the last three years;9 (4) a reduction of the maximum death benefit payable
to survivors to $2,500, down from $3,500 which was likewise formerly
indexed to wages. Collectively, these changes will adversely affect those
women whose participation in the labour force is low-paying and fragile
and will reduce the distributive features of CPP. As Townson points out,
lower-income workers may find it hard to assimilate such a sharp increase
in contributions over a short period since they pay contributions on the

whole of their income, as opposed to those earning higher than average
earnings, who contribute only on a portion. The difficulty will be
exacerbated for the self-employed, who have to fund both sets of
contributions themselves (Townson, 1997: 61–4). Freezing the year’s basic
exemption will over time draw more very low income workers into the
contributions

requirement (Townson, 1997: 62; NAC in House of

Commons, 1997f: 1625). Reducing the death benefit payable to survivors is
also more likely to negatively affect women, given gendered survival
figures. Basing the benefit on the last five years of earnings as opposed to
three will result in lower pensions generally, with adverse effects for
those who rely mainly on CPP for retirement income.

STRA TEGIC USE OF GENDER-BASED ARGUM ENTS

Yet it would not be true to say that the consequences for women of the
government’s proposals were ignored entirely in the debate. In fact they were
highlighted in responses across the political spectrum. Thus, labour
spokespersons opposed any reductions in benefits on the ground s that ‘they
would adversely affect low-income Canadians, fundamentally alter the social
insurance

side

of

the

plan

and

adversely

affect

women’

(Federal/Provincial/Territorial CPP Consultations Secretariat, 1996a: 22).
Liberal Parliamentary Secretary Valeri referred in parliamentary debate to
the ‘gender analysis that was put forward that showed that in fact women

would receive $2.56 of benefits for every dollar of contribution’ (House of
Common s, 1997b). Meanwhile, the official opposition [Reform] party
leader, Preston Manning, said

When I look at the bill I am reminded that we are dealing with the principal
source of income of people who are no longer in a position to add to their
income. All of us know of middle aged [and] elderly women who invested most
of their lives in raising children in the home and who entered the so-called
official workplace . . . late in life or not at all and therefore qualify for little or
no CPP benefits . . . [We] should keep the needs of these women uppermost as
we consider pension reform. (House of Common s, 1997a)

The latter position certainly evinces a concern for that group of women who
are most disadvantaged by the enduring link between labour markets and
pension entitlements. However, less consideration was extended to those
women who remain in the paid labour force in marginal and insecure
positions. No suggestion was made that it might be worth examining the
possibilities of restructuring the labour market to allow the enhanced
participation of women (Fraser, 1998). Nor did the solution that was offered
by the Reform Party to mitigate this disadvantage involve an uncoupling or a
deemphasis of the link between pension entitlements and labour force
participation. It actually did support dismantling the CPP entirely, but in
order to move to individual retirement savings account s to which employers
and employees would contribute. Thus the Reform Party (Ablonczy) called

for
moving . . . to a fully funded system based on individual account s while
protecting the benefits of current seniors. This means that individuals will own
all

the assets in their account and their retirement benefits will be

substantially greater. When they die their children and their spouse will
inherit the capital. This would go a long way toward eliminating poverty for
elderly widows, for example. . . Countries from around the world are
following the example of Chile in moving from publicly to privately owned
and managed pensions. . . (House of Common s, 1997a)

While this proposal was ultimately unsuccessful in this iteration of the
debate, it should be noted that the Reform Party’s position is a clear
rejection of a socially redistributive element to the CPP. The association
of a market-based pension delivery system with enhanced financial
autonomy should be closely examined by feminists, especially if it is
assumed, as the Reform Party did, that women will be recipients of
pension income not in their own right, but by the inheritance from their
families of market-based pension gains. Further, as Philipps (forth coming)
points out in the context of recent developments in Canadian tax policy,
one of the ironies of neoliberal discourse in Canada is the possibility of
appropriation of feminist knowledges and arguments to further political
agendas which are not typically in sympathy with feminist objectives.
In the end, what are we to make of the fact that the more radical policy
options that were initially put forward by the government’s information

paper (eliminating survivor benefits altogether, only partially indexing
pensions, reducing the rate at which CPP benefits would replace income
from 25 percent down to 22.5 percent, raising the age of entitlement,
reducing the number of non-working or low-income years that could be
dropped out) would have had even worse consequences for women but
ultimately were not enacted (Federal/Provincial/Territorial Governments of
Canada, 1996b)? Is this to be read as a success for the feminist activists,
such as the representatives of NAC who appeared before the SCF (to
which the CPP bill was referred after its second reading in parliament), or
other women’s organizations who participated in the public consultations
on CPP and focused primarily on the benefits proposals made by the
government? 10 While at first glance it may appear to be so in the sense that
more regressive proposals were avoided, if taken in the context of the
legislative reforms as a whole, there is little cause for satisfaction. This is
because the price that was paid for maintaining benefits and access to
benefits was precisely the ‘marketization’ of the CPP, as the following
discussion demonstrates.

INVESTMENT STRA TEGY AND FUND GOV E R N AN CE

The chief innovation of the 1997 legislation was a shift to a more financial
market-based investment strategy for CPP, with the aim of maximizing
returns to the fund and building up its capital. This was widely viewed by

‘business, labour and seniors groups’ as a compromise solution to the
problems of the CPP’s so-called ‘unfunded liability’. Indeed, the consensus
about the need for a shift to the financial markets extended to women’s
organizations which ‘supported improved investment of the CPP fund’
(Federal/Provincial/Territorial CPP Consulations Secretariat, 1996a: 22, 25).
Previously, any surplus in the fund not needed to meet current obligations to
pensioners had been lent to provincial governments at below-market
interest rates to accomplish various public finance projects (Deaton, 1989:
223–5). Following the passage of the CPP Investment Board Act, CPP funds
are now being invested in the equity markets.11 A new investment board
has been established to manage any amount s transferred to it ‘in the best
interests of the contributor s and beneficiaries’ under the Act. It is to invest
its assets ‘with a view to achieving a maximum rate of return, without
undue risk of loss’ (s. 5). The attempts of labour spokespersons to advocate
investment objectives such as ‘meeting economic goals for the country ’ or
‘secondary objectives to promote economic development’ or ‘regional
economic development’ (Federal/Provincial/Territorial CPP Consultations
Secretariat, 1996a: 36, 57) were roundly criticized by financial planners,
investment dealers and pension experts who appeared in a special
consultation session before the legislation was enacted. This latter position
was support ed by the government in drafting the legislation. As in the Social
Security debate in the US, a major concern expressed by some participants
was the possibility for ‘government intervention’ in CPP investment

decisions (Federal/Provincial/Territorial CPP Consultations Secretariat,
1996a: 36; Manning in House of Commons, 1997a). The legislative
solution here was to allow the new CPP Investment Board to ‘hire
qualified investment professionals to manage the day-today investment
decisions at arm’s length from governments’ (House of Commons, 1997c:
2699).12
The tradeoff for minimizing ‘government intervention’ in the investment
activity of the newly marketized CPP was a variety of governance norms
drawn from corporate and trust law. These include a fiduciary duty to the
Investment Board imposed on individual directors and officers who should
have ‘proven financial ability or relevant work experience’, the ability to hire
qualified investment professionals with discretionary author ity to manage
the fund, and the requirement to invest according to a ‘prudent portfolio’
standard, as elaborated in a written, publicly available investment policy
required by the draft regulations. As the legislation was being passed, the
only issue of major debate with respect to the investment strategy had to do
with whether the fund should be invested actively or passively (i.e.
replicating an existing stock exchange index). The debate here centred on
various pension funds’ experiences with index-based investing, along with a
concern that this particular fund (estimated to be some C$60 billion by the
year 2006) would be too large to make passive investing viable. In the end, the
draft regulations

require

passive investing.13 In this sense, as the

‘governmentality’ literature would suggest (Miller and Rose, 1990), a

financial market-based risk management strategy and the employment of
financial ‘expertise’ accompanies the use of legal governance norms derived
from corporate and trust law. These strategies are employed in an attempt to
control the now enhanced market risk resulting from the turn to financial
markets for pension funding.

It should be noted, however, that the

establishment of a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of contributor s
and beneficiaries simply replicates, or submerges, the apparent interest
group antagonisms that prompt ed the legislative changes in the first place. It
also suggests that the way the Board operationalizes its obligation to act in
the interests of the entire Canadian working population will be significant
(Cooper, 1997).
Meanwhile at the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance
review of the legislation after second reading, NAC had raised the issues of
whether (1) the investment board had to consist entirely of financial
professionals, or whether room should be made for representatives of CPP
beneficiaries and (2) why there had been ‘no discussion of the possible use of
ethical investment criteria’ for the fund (NAC in House of Commons, 1997f:
1630). This attempt to broaden the base of participation in running the fund
as well as its investment goals was vigorously and successfully resisted by
pension experts. With respect to participation, all that the legislation
ultimately requires is that there be a biennial public meeting in each
participating province, but it does not embody the Senate Committee on
Banking Trade and Commerce’s recommendation that at least one director
of the fund attend. Instead the legislation (s. 52) requires only that ‘one or

more directors or officers’ attend to meet with any of the beneficiaries
whose interests they are to maximize. In legislating for fund governance
therefore, a singular interest in fund maximization, to be accomplished by
using a circumscribed fiduciary obligation to govern low-visibility decision
making was privileged, and articulated through a discourse of preventing
‘government

interference’,

rather

than

of

attempting

to

further

democratic participation or accountability (Valverde et al., 1999: 29–30).

C PP

AND

N E O LIBERALI SM

The outcome of the CPP debate suggests the ambiguities associated with a
‘privatization’ discourse, since the result here was that the CPP would retain
the features of mandatory labour market-wide contributions and the
payment of defined benefits, but that funds would be raised in private equity
markets to supplement contributions. Yet a move away from a commitment
to collective responsibility for pension provision has clearly taken place
(Guest, 1980/97: 293), as evidenced partly in the debate about benefit and
contribution issues, and partly in the shift to a market-based investment
strategy accompanied by governance norms drawing on risk management
and fiduciary obligations, according significant discretionary authority to
investment decision makers. A major discursive as well as material effect of
the 1997 legislative changes was that returns from the financial markets were
considered a preferable alternative to socialized reliance on other workers in

a pay-as-you-go system ( O’Malley, 1992: 259, 261). This discursive shift has
implications for the future of a redistributive rationale for pension
entitlements generally, which is likely to have further negative effects for
women. A gendered example of the neoliberal attack on redistribution from
workers to pensioners as the raison d’etre for pension policy can be
found in the comment of Michael Walker, Executive Director of a
prominent Canadian thinktank, the Frazer Institute, that ‘[U]nder the
CPP women who live longer collect more in total benefits but do not pay
higher premiums. This is, simply put, inequitable’. On being pressed
further about this, Walker responded ‘You’re subsidizing the women’s
pensions with the contributions of the men . . . that’s confusing an issue of
subsidy with an issue of paying for people’s pensions. I don’t think we
should be doing that either’ ( House of Common s, 1997d). As a result of
the CPP legislation, pension contributors and recipients were transformed
into stakeholders in an investment fund by means of discourses of
financial rectitude, and individualized gender-neutral ‘fairness’, with little
opportunity provided to render the ensuing decision making democratically
accountable.

M U T U AL F U N D RE GU LATI ON

In the midst of the panic about the future of CPP, the significance of RRSPs
to Canadian retirement planning is increasing. This phenomenon is

supported by federal government provision of favourable tax treatment to
amount s invested in RRSPs (Young, 1997) as well as a decline in employer
sponsored pension coverage (Townson, 1997). Up to a ceiling of some
C$15,500 of income, amount s contributed to an RRSP may be deducted from
income before calculating the tax payable. Further, tax payable on the income
earned on these savings is deferred until the funds are withdrawn, although
this can be before the individual retires. As Young has argued with respect to
both occupational pension plans and RRSPs, investment patterns here are
gendered, in the sense that women are less likely to work for large
employers who offer pension plans and tend to have less ‘discretionary
income’ to contribute to RRSPs (Donnelly, 1993; Young, 1997: 320–21). She
also points out that the possibility for wage earners to contribute to spousal
RRSPs (i.e. a transfer of funds into the plan of a lower-income spouse)
reinforces traditional gender relations within families. Similarly, Townson
reports that men, on average, contribute a smaller percentage of their
average earnings to RRSPs than do women, but argues that this is because
men are more likely than women to have employer-sponsored plans, which
limit the amount s that can be contributed to an RRSP (Townson, 1995: 56,
1997: 44). Statistics Canada reports that, overall, more men than women
invest in this fashion and in greater amount s (Townson, 1995: 89). In 1993
the average amount contributed by women was $2,931 compared with an
average of $4,360 for men. Individuals in nonstandard jobs are also more
likely to use retirement savings accumulated in RRSPs in advance of
retirement, for financial support during periods of unemployment or when

withdrawing from the paid workforce because of family responsibilities
(Townson, 1997: 49). A key point however is that ‘nearly half of all RRSP
deductions are claimed by the 12.5% of tax filers with the highest incomes’
(Townson, 1997: 57; Dickinson, 1996: 189; Guest, 1980/97: 283). It is
argued that foregone government revenue as a result of tax exemptions for
private pension plans amount s to about $12 billion a year, ‘about 40% of
the total cost of public pension programs such as OAS/G IS and the CPP’
(Guest, 1980/97: 283).
Meanwhile the popularity of the mutual fund, a collective investment
vehicle similar to a unit trust or managed investment, whose value is
dependent on the value of the financial instruments it invests in, and which
allows for diversification of investment risk, has increased dramatically in
Canada in the last decade or so (Stromb erg, 1998: 24). Mutual fund assets
stood at C$394 billion at the end of 1998, up from $30 billion in 1989.
Seven million

Canadian households hold at least one mutual fund

(Senate, 1997: 5: 76). There are more than 1,300 mutual funds in Canada,
sold by more than 80,000 registrants at brokers, mutual fund dealers,
independent distributor s and banks. A recent report (Stromberg, 1998: 135)
points out that ‘there are now more investment funds in Canada than there
are stocks listed on Canadian stock exchanges’.
This phenomenon has resulted in a dramatic upgrading of regulatory
oversight of mutual fund operations, which has taken a variety of forms. The
link between regulation of investment in mutual funds and saving for
retirement has been acknowledged by David Brown, the current Chair of

the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), the provincial government
regulator of mutu al funds. 14 In one of the first speeches of his tenure, given to
the Investment Funds Institute of Canada in July 1998 he said, ‘At the
present time we do not have the tools to cope with a serious market reversal.
Nor would we have answers for investors whose savings comprise these
billions of dollars as to why their retirement dreams may have been lost’.
The regulatory initiatives that have been taken in Ontario over the last
few years to reduce the market risk faced by individual pension investors
include: the commissioning by the Canadian Securities Administrators, an
umbrella organization for provincial securities commissions, of a member
of the OSC to make recommendations for regulating investment funds
(Stromb erg, 1995); the establishment of a selfregulatory organization – the
Mutu al Fund Dealers Association (MFDA) – to govern mutual fund dealers
selling produ cts to the public; new regulatory instruments governing sales
practices engaged in by mutual funds (NI 81–105), and a simplified prospectus
system for mutual funds (NI 81–101); a variety of enforcement initiatives
targeted at mutual funds and their dealers, including a compliance review of
23 mutual fund dealers conducted over a two-y ear period; and hearings
against specific fund managers suspected of violating provisions of
securities legislation and regulation. The regulatory infractions involved
include failures to disclose conflicts of interest in advice-giving and
inappropriate investment advice given to inexperienced investors (DeLellis,
Mersch). These regulatory initiatives are premised on the recognition that

individuals saving for their retirement through RRSPs and mutual funds do
not typically make investment decisions themselves but rely on intermediaries
and financial ‘experts’ of one kind or another to do so for them.
The recent frenzy of legal and regulatory activity has culminated to date in
another report authored by Commissioner Stromberg, this time for Industry
Canada (Stromb erg, 1998), which is oriented towards ‘consumer’ protection.
This report advocates the recognition of what is described as the
‘retailization’ of the financial marketplace, and specifically the diffuse
nature of the market for investment products. One of its most striking
features

is

the

recommendation

that

individuals

be

offered

the

opportunity to learn how to manage investment risks, including the ‘risk
inherent in being too conservative’, along with support for investor
economic education at a young age in the interests of enhancing ‘wealth
management’ (Stromb erg, 1998: 28; Appendix D: 2). In other word s, the
report posits that future pensioners need to be educated to accept risks, and
it

is further

observed

that

this education

would

‘facilitate

the

implementation of a broader range of governmental initiatives in the area
of pension and other retirement benefit programs including the increased
privatization

thereof’

(Stromberg,

1998:

68).

Should

these

recommendations be adopted by regulatory authorities, they would
clearly further a neoliberal agenda of individualized acceptance of market risk
in pension provision. While these recommendations are presented, again, in
gender-neutral terms, the data presented above on gender-based differences
in RRSP investment suggest that women are less well positioned to generate

adequate retirement income by means of investment in mutual

funds.

Furthermore, there is interesting empirical work to be done to investigate the
extent to which individual investment strategies are gendered and how
intermediaries construct the ‘risk profiles’ of their clients in accordance with
selfregulatory codes. The feminist economics literature suggests, in general,
that the ‘rational actor’ model of market decision making may itself be
gendered (England, 1993; Ferber and Nelson, 1993).
As a result of this regulatory activity, the legal relationship between
investors and their financial intermediaries is in the process of being
redefined. This is also occurring through the courts, in the context of civil
actions launched by individual investors alleging breach of fiduciary duty
(Hodgkinson v. Simms [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377). The risk of private
investing is being actively reshaped by tax, securities and tort law. Indeed,
a plurality of regulatory mechanisms, some familiar from private, corporate
law contexts, and others staples of administrative regulation, are being
pressed into the service of facilitating financial market-based retirement
well-being for those who can afford to avail of it. The existence of this legal
code, addressing issues of risk management and techniques of investor
account ability (Condon , 1996; Rose, 1996: 350–1) amply demonstrates that
this is not an unfettered market, but in fact relies on considerable legal
resources to support it. Deregulation is not at all the order of the day in
this sphere. Taking the CPP and mutual fund developments together,
however, it is possible to see that the role of the state, through legal
governance, is shifting towards structuring market risk and away from the

direct provision of financial benefits, which will have the effect of producing
further material inequality.

C ON C L USI ON : H O W S HO U L D FEMI N ISTS RESP ON D ?

In its focus on individualized risk and its deemphasis of redistribution, the
pension privatization debate in Canada is a classic example of what Rose calls
the ‘death of the social’. Yet the consequences of this demise vary according
to gender, sexuality and class position. Thus, the marketization of the CPP,
illustrated by the investment strategy adopted and the inequitable increase in
contribution requirements, can be contrasted with the tax revenue-based
support of RRSP investment, which helps to ensure that wealthy workers
will get wealthy pensions. All of this presents a dilemma for feminist
political and legal strategizing, since feminists have historically relied on or
exhorted the state to recognize and act upon the need for gender-sensitive
decommodification. As Fraser puts it, the ‘welfare state is crucial for gender
relations’ (1998: 55). Fraser herself argues that feminists need to abandon the
effort to achieve two competing visions of the ‘feminist welfare state’, which
she describes as the ‘universal breadwinner’ model and the ‘caregiver parity’
model. In the first, the universal breadwinner model, the goal is for women’s
work lives to become the same as men’s, while the ideal of caregiver parity
would ‘revalue feminine life patterns’.15 Fraser claims that neither can ensure

gender justice because neither fully integrates redistributive goals with
recognition of

gender difference. The universal breadwinner model

‘valorizes men’s traditional sphere’, while the caregiver model would
‘entrench gender disparities in income’ and institute a ‘mommy track’
(1998: 59). Rather, her own blueprint would advocate a third alternative to
‘deconstruct

the

genderbased

differentiation

of

breadwinning

and

caregiving’. Specifically, it would require restructuring the organization of
work by ‘envisioning a society in which women’s current life-patterns are
the norm for everyone’ (1998: 63–4). Thus, social and political institutions
should be redesigned to ensure that men, like women, combine caregiving
with breadwinning, and that the practical difficulties of doing this are
eliminated. Translated into the pension context, this would likely require
pension entitlements to be more fully cognisant of the need to fulfil both
roles, the need to take time out of the paid labour force, the need to work
part-time, the need to have careers flexible enough to accomodate
workplace and caring labour, and in general to decrease the link between
pensions and the paid labour market.
The problem with this of course, is that the opportunity for feminists to
push the welfare state in this direction (Donnelly, 1993) is receding under the
onslaught of market-oriented policy making, bringing with it new
inequalities of gender-based risk. As Rose puts it, ‘the state may no longer be
assuming responsibility for the management of a whole variety of risks’
(1996: 338). So feminist strategizers face a real dilemma of whether to
pursue efforts to reinvigorate the redistributive goals of the welfare state,

for example, by moving away from labour market-based benefits to
universal ones, or on the other hand, to reorient themselves to engage with
the increasing role played by the state in securing the control of market
risk through legal and other governance mechanisms. A few, admittedly
speculative, comments may be offered on this question. With respect to
the former option, it would seem import ant not to abandon redistribution
as a collective commitment, but rather to keep that normative goal alive.
Part of the approach here may involve seeking to deconstruct the
opposition often posed between redistribution and market norms, by
pointing out, as some economists have argued, that markets may have a
redistributive effect (Bromley, 1997). It may also be possible, in this era of
‘post-social politics’ (O’Malley et al., 1997), to seek new rationales for
redistribution. With respect to the latter option, an aspect of the agenda
here might be, as I have suggested earlier, to interrogate the techniques
and goals of account ability, accomplished via legal mechanisms, of those
institutions involved in financial market pension provision, and indeed to
reinvigorate wider discourses of account ability than are countenanced by
a focus on risk management (Valverde et al., 1999). Another, broader
possibility is to render explicit the connections between the distribution of
pension provision by means of the market, and questions of just how
pension contributions to mutual funds, pension funds and the CPP fund are
invested. As Blackburn points out, the murkiness of this connection at
present is in part due to the private law norms that govern investment by
these institutions (1999: 6–7, 36–8). Although the preremptory way in which

N AC’s proposal for ‘ethical investment criteria’ was dismissed in the CPP
debate may not augur well for this endeavour in Canada, it is a central
component of a contemporary feminist analysis of pensions.
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1.

This project, funded by the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council and based at Osgoode Hall Law School’s Institute of Feminist Legal
Studies, is entitled ‘Feminism, Law and the Challenge of Privatization’.

2.

The programme in fact represents a cluster of three benefits: (1) Old Age
Security (OAS), based on age (65 years) and years of residence in Canada; (2)
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), providing additional benefits to those
with low incomes, with the benefits payable varying with marital status; and (3)

Spouse’s Allowance, providing further benefits to those who are spouses of
OAS recipients, or survivors aged 60 to 64 years.
3.

Note that CPP also pays disability benefits to those of pre-retirement age who
are eligible.
Statistics Canada does not use the benchmark of ‘poverty line’, but rather the

4.

term ‘low income’. This is defined as spending at least 20 percent more of
pretax income than the Canadian average on food, shelter and clothing.
5.

Participation in employer-based pension funds will not be dealt with in this
article. The salient points here, according to Townson (1997: 30–40) are that as
nonstandard work increases, employer-based pension coverage is declining,
and the coverage of women workers is, accordingly, lower than that of men.

6.

According to the Consultations Secretariat, these consultations were held
between 15 April and 10 June 1996 in 33 sessions held in 18 cities.

7.

Time out of the paid labour force to raise children under the age of seven and 15
percent of the lowest earning years can be dropped out of the calculation of the
‘contributory period’ on which benefits are based.
8.

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 15. This reconsideration has
resulted in the passage in June 2000 of a Federal Modernization of Benefits and
Obligations Act (S.C. 2000, c.12). Among other changes, this extends the
survivor and pension-sharing benefits of CPP to ‘commonlaw partners’,
defined as ‘a person who is cohabiting with the contributor in a conjugal
relationship’ and who has so cohabited ‘for a continuous period of at least
one year’.

9.

This change was apparently made to bring CPP ‘in line with the majority of
private plans’.

10.

The list of women’s organizations who participated in the public consultations

about CPP included the Manitoba Action Committee on the Status of Women,
British Columbia Farm Women’s Network , National Association of Women
and the Law, Northwest Territories Status of Women, Yukon Status of Women,
Manitoba Women’s Advisory Council, the Older Women’s Network Metro
Toronto and Area Council, Disabled Women’s Network , and l’Association
feminine d’education et d’action sociale.
11.

While the investment figure stands at C$11.9 million (as of March 1999), the
Board is expected to receive C$66 billion of funds over the next 10 years.

12.

These investment managers, Toronto Dominion Bank and Barclays Global
Investors Canada Ltd were chosen in March 1999.

13.

However, in December 1999 a federal/provincial review of the CPP approved
a shift to ‘active management’ of 50 percent of the fund.

14.

Regulation of mutual funds in Canada is provincially based, with the main body
of governing legislation located in provincial Securities Acts.

15.

These competing visions have manifested themselves in the past in difficulties
for Canadian feminist activists in developing a consistent position on pension
reform (Vickers et al., 1993).
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